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The apartheid city 
 
The „apartheid city‟ in South Africa stands out as an extreme example of urban 
social engineering. Urban segregation was pervasive across the colonial world, 
some other cities in colonial and even post-colonial Africa were subject to 
massive forced removals or restrictions on urbanisation that compared to South 
Africa under apartheid (Freund, 2001; Burton, 2005), and ghettos are certainly 
not uniquely South African. Nonetheless, the apartheid city was distinctive in 
several important respects.  
 
Firstly, its basis was not simply the usual binary division between „white‟ 
(„European‟) and „black‟ („native‟, „Bantu‟ or „African‟), or citizen and subject, 
or colonial and colonised, with some ambiguity surrounding people of mixed 
descent as well as African people of high status. Instead, statutory „racial‟ 
classification demarcated also separate „coloured‟ as well as „Indian‟ 
populations: the category „Indian‟ referred to the descendents of people brought 
from South Asia, mostly as indentured workers in the late nineteenth century; 
„coloured‟ encompassed an arbitrary mix of people, including the descendents of 
the indigenous Khoi and San populations of the Western Cape, people 
descended from slaves brought to the Cape from Malaysia and Indonesia, an 
people of „mixed-race‟ (Christopher, 2002; Posel, 2001). This rigid 
classificatory system combined with strict prohibitions on inter-racial marriage 
and sex, removing the possibility of assimilation or other forms of boundary-
crossing.  
 
Secondly, residential segregation was especially thorough, and controls on 
urbanisation unusually severe. Residential segregation (under the Group Areas 
Act) resulted in towns that were mercilessly divided into separate „white‟, 
„coloured‟, „Indian‟ and „African‟ areas. Hundreds of thousands of people were 
forcibly removed, especially in the 1960s, into racially-designated „group areas‟ 
(Western, 1981; Field, 2001). Residential segregation was linked to the 
systematic regulation of social interaction in both public spaces (especially 
municipal facilities). In addition, „influx control‟, i.e. restrictions under the 
„pass‟ laws on where African people could live and work, served both to limit 
the growth of the urban African population and to determine where African 
workers could live if they were allowed into the cities. Many male African 
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workers were confined to overcrowded migrant hostels, whilst shack settlements 
were largely prohibited from the cities and towns in „white‟ South Africa. 
Family accommodation for African people in the cities was limited to the small 
and standardised „matchbox‟ housing in highly planned townships such as 
Soweto. Unemployed African men and most African women and children were 
excluded from the apartheid city through mass arrests, prosecutions and 
deportations. 
 











The apartheid city was thus highly ordered spatially, with the archetypal design 
illustrated tellingly by Davies (1981; see also Lemon, 1991; Christopher, 1994: 
103–40).  Figure 1 illustrates this for the port city of Cape Town. The historic 
city centre, the „Southern Suburbs‟ stretching down the Cape Peninsula and the 
„Northern Suburbs‟ curving along low hills inland to the north-east – the axes 
indicated by black lines – were almost entirely set aside for white settlement. 
African settlements were successively removed eastwards, away from the city 
centre, to the areas marked as “A”. The coloured population was the primary 
victim of forced removals from the 1960s through to the 1970s, subjected to 
relocation from what became uniformly white areas to more distant areas, 
especially on the sandy „Cape Flats‟ to the south-east (marked “C”).  
 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly of all, the purpose of racial segregation 
was not simply to separate „racial‟ groups but also to ensure a clear racial 
hierarchy in which „poor whites‟ would be lifted, economically and socially, 
above almost all non-white people. The consequence of this was that inequality 
in South African cities took on a caste-like form, with largely impermeable 
boundaries between castes. Caste shaped class in that someone‟s racial 
classification shaped the range of possible class positions open to him or her, 
although each caste comprised a set of classes. At the same time, class shaped 
the caste system, in that some aspects of racial discrimination and segregation 
served the interests of some sections of the bourgeoisie (notably the gold-mining 
houses and many commercial farmers) and many white South African workers 
(who restricted competition from black workers for better-paid employment). 
 
Urban segregation therefore also entailed ghettoisation. South Africans 
classified as white lived in relatively prosperous neighbourhoods with good 
municipal infrastructure, with lucrative pockets of commercial activity. Rapid 
economic growth under apartheid resulted in suburbanisation. South Africans 
classified as coloured or Indian were removed to less-serviced neighbourhoods, 
where poverty, drugs and gangs were rife. „Townships‟ for the African 
population were provided with minimal infrastructure on the grounds that 
African people were temporarily resident in „white‟ South Africa, and would 
and should return to the rural areas in due course. In addition, any infrastructure 
should be funded out of revenues raised from within these poor neighbourhoods. 
Policing was thorough, but services were minimal (with electrification only in 
the 1980s). In most townships, African people were not permitted to own their 
houses. Restrictions on construction meant that, at least from the 1970s, housing 
in coloured, Indian and African neighbourhoods was severely overcrowded, and 
shacks proliferated in backyards (Swilling et al., 1991). 
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The most impoverished ghettoes in apartheid South Africa were located not in 
the city, however, but in the supposed rural areas in the „bantustans‟, i.e. the 
supposedly self-governing (and even „independent‟) „homelands‟ set aside for 
African people so that the denial of South African citizenship might be more 
defensible. Urbanisation was „displaced‟ (Simkins, 1983; Murray, 1987) into 
slums such as Phuthaditjaba (on the border with Lesotho), whose population 
grew from 24,000 in 1970 to (officially) 342,000 in 1991 (Nattrass, 2000). Only 
a few of these slums were in commuting distance of cities in „white‟ South 
Africa (see Lelyveld, 1986: ch. 5).  
 
Economic growth and change brought changes in the class structure of South 
Africa which in turn shaped political conflict. Skill shortages in the late 
apartheid period led to the steady relaxation of the „colour bar‟ in employment, 
especially in the service sector. Growing numbers of African men and women 
moved into better-paid employment (Crankshaw, 1997). At the same time, 
deagrarianisation together with a stagnant demand for unskilled labour in urban 
areas meant that open unemployment rose rapidly. Influx control kept many, but 
not all, unemployment people in „rural‟ slums. Continuing racial segregation and 
ghettoisation helped to forge the political coalition in African townships that 
drove the „township revolt‟ against the apartheid state in the 1980s: upwardly 
mobile, skilled workers and the nascent African middle-class, forced to remain 
in infrastructurally-deprived and ever more overcrowded townships, and 
repeatedly denied dignity; semi-skilled workers suffering from industrial 
stagnation; rural immigrants contesting influx control; and growing ranks of 
young unemployed. Mass unemployment also helped to fuel defiance of the 




The persistence of inequality after apartheid 
 
In 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison, the African National 
Congress (ANC) and other organisations were unbanned, and negotiations over 
political change began. Four years later, in 1994, the country held its first 
democratic elections, won by the ANC. By 1994, almost all legislation which 
discriminated on explicitly racial grounds had been abolished: people could now 
vote in elections, live or attend school anywhere, do any work, and marry and 
have sex, all without regard for racial classification. Inequalities, however, 
remained: the legacy of the past could not be undone overnight.  
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Researchers, political leaders and (of course) poor South Africans themselves 
had long been aware of the persistence of poverty, but accurate data had only 
become available for the first time in 1993. Using the standard and ungenerous 
international poverty measure of US$1 per person day (adjusted for local 
purchasing power), one in four South Africans lived in (deep) poverty in 1994, 
whilst as many as one half had incomes below the more generous poverty line 
favoured in South Africa itself. One in six South Africans was not expected to 
survive to the age of forty – a proportion that was to grow as the AIDS 
pandemic reduced life expectancy by one quarter. At the same time, a minority 
of South Africans, almost all white, enjoyed evident prosperity. Inequality 
meant that the „poverty gap‟, defined as the aggregate amount by which poor 
peoples‟ incomes are below the poverty line as a proportion of the total income 
in society, was very small. A perfectly targeted transfer of only 5 percent of 
national income from rich to poor would have sufficed to eliminate poverty, 
even using the higher South African poverty line set above US$1 per person 
day.  Given that the top household income decile, i.e. the richest 10 percent of 
households, earned almost exactly one-half of the national income, they would 
only have to forsake one-tenth of their aggregate incomes to have eliminated 
poverty (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).   
 
The transition to democracy, marked by democratic elections in 1994, was 
unsurprisingly accompanied by high hopes that income poverty and inequality 
would be reduced.  The votes of poor people had helped to ensure victory for the 
ANC, which had campaigned around the promise of „a better life for all‟.  Its 
election manifesto – the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – 
identified „attacking poverty and deprivation‟ as „the first priority of the 
democratic government‟; all South Africans should enjoy „a decent living 
standard and economic security‟ (ANC, 1994). The 1996 constitution also 
recognised socio-economic rights, to health care, „sufficient food and water‟ and 
income security, albeit subject to the availability of resources, as well as 
education. These and other rights were said to be based on the „democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom‟. 
 
The performance of the democratic ANC-led government following the 1994 
elections is a matter of some debate. On the one hand, the ANC itself cautiously 
lauds its success, at least in „laying the foundations‟ for the elimination of 
poverty (South Africa, 2003, 2007). On the other hand, a series of critical 
commentators have argued that the ideals of 1994 have been betrayed 
repeatedly, as the ANC has adopted „neo-liberal‟ policies that reproduced the 
inequities of the past. „Apartheid did not die‟, in the words of John Pilger 
(2006). In this view, the racialised inequities of apartheid gave way to new 
„market‟ inequities, as the post-apartheid political elite embraced (or was 
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embraced by) global neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism was seen to be especially 
rampant in South African cities, which offered appropriate spaces for global 
capitalism to circumvent possible restrictions arising from national politics. 
Neo-liberalism is said to have made Cape Town, for example, into „one of the 
most – if not the most – unequal cities in the world‟ (McDonald, 2008: 42; 
emphasis in the original). The deep inequalities that were nurtured by apartheid, 
through direct, coercive and inegalitarian intervention, are now being 
reproduced, it is argued, precisely because the state has withdrawn from playing 
an active role in the regulation of markets, i.e. the state is withdrawing from any 
commitment to decommodification. Scholars pointed to policies such as the 
privatisation of or introduction of user-charges (and cost-recovery) for 
municipal services, the delegation to the private sector of house-building, and 
the proliferation of gated communities and business-led improvement districts 
(McDonald and Pape, 2002; Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002; Harrison et 
al., 2003; McDonald, 2008). 
 
There is indeed strong evidence that both income poverty and inequality 
worsened in the years immediately following the transition to democracy in 
1994. Income poverty and inequality worsened disproportionately in South 
Africa‟s cities as the urban elite and middle classes prospered whilst rapid rural-
to-urban migration combined with rising unemployment rates to swell the ranks 
of the urban poor. In the early 2000s, however, income poverty seems to have 
declined, in part due to a modest decline in unemployment, but primarily 
because of the expansion of public welfare programmes (Van der Berg et al., 
2008; Leibbrandt et al., 2009; Seekings, 2009).   
 
Delineating the class structure of South Africa – or of South African cities – is 
not straightforward, given the limits of both the available data and the 
theoretical understanding of what constitutes a meaningful conception of class in 
a context such as South Africa‟s. Using data on occupations, income from 
wealth and business activities, and household composition, the class structure 
can be understood in terms of ten classes, which can be combined into three 
composite categories. The composite „upper class‟ category comprises 
households with substantial earnings from wealth or business, or including 
people in professional or managerial occupations. A middle category 
encompassing households that included people in semi-professional, supervisory 
and skilled occupations, as well as semi- and unskilled workers outside of 
domestic work and agriculture. It also included households with modest 
earnings from wealth or business (labelled „petty traders‟ for convenience). A 
lower category comprised households in which workers were in unskilled 
occupations in the marginal sectors of domestic work and agriculture or in low-
income self-employment, together with a systematically disadvantaged 
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3 ‘upper’ classes, defined by occupation 
(managerial or professional), wealth or 
(substantial) business activity: 
14% of households, 46% of income 
(17% / 49% in metro areas) 
 
4 classes in a middle position: the semi-
professional class, intermediate class, core 
working class and petty traders: 
38% of households, 34% of income 
(44% / 34% in metro areas) 
 
3 ‘lower’ classes: the marginal working 
class, underclass (defined in terms of 
systematic disadvantage in the labour 
market) and a residual ‘other’ category: 
48% of households, 20% of income  
(39% / 17% in metro areas) 
„underclass‟ trapped in unemployment (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: chapters 7 
and 8). In 1993, on the eve of the first democratic elections, the upper classes 
accounted for 12 percent of the total population of households but 45 percent of 
the national income. The middle category accounted for 48 percent of 
households and 45 percent of national income. The lower classes accounted for 
41 percent of households, but only 10 percent of national income. Household 
incomes in the upper category were, on average, more than fifteen times larger 


















Figure 2: The Class Structure of South Africa, 2008 (calculated from NIDS data) 
 
Fifteen years later, the class structure shows limited changes. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of households and income in 2008, using data from the first wave of 
the National Income Dynamics Study. Figures in brackets refer to the six major 
metropolitan areas only. Whilst the data from 1993 and 2008 are not precisely 
comparable, they suggest that the upper classes have maintained their privileged 
position, and perhaps even grown slightly.  The middle category has, however, 
shrunk in terms of its share of the total population of households, and the lower 
category has grown in terms of its shares of both the total population of 
households and the national income. Many households in the lower category 
have benefited from the government‟s social assistance programmes (as well as 
housing programmes). Inter-class income inequalities have declined somewhat 
since 1993, but remain large: households in the upper category have, on average, 
incomes three and a half times larger than households in the middle category, 
and approximately eight times larger than households in the lower category.  
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A comparison of data from 1993 and 2008 suggests that there has been some 
continued social polarisation in post-apartheid South Africa. Such a conclusion 
is supported by an additional detail. The „core working class‟ – defined as 
households dependent on semi-skilled and unskilled workers in sectors other 
than agriculture and domestic work – seems to have shrunk very dramatically 
across this fifteen-year period, perhaps by as much as two-thirds. The effect of 
this has been muted for reasons suggested by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw 
(2009), on the basis of their analysis of somewhat older occupational data from 
censuses. They found, in the case of Cape Town, that there was significant 
deindustrialisation in the late apartheid and early post-apartheid periods. The 
decline of middle-income jobs in occupations such as artisan, machine operator 
and driver between 1980 and 2001 was matched, however, by rising 
employment of middle-income clerks, sales and personal service workers. 
Household and labour force data suggest, however, that formal semi- and 
unskilled employment has declined in general, possibly because of the effects of 
labour market institutions and regulations. This has also been partly offset by 
rising low-income informal employment. The decline of lower-paid, semi- and 
unskilled but formal working class occupations has entailed some polarisation. 
 
The lower cluster of classes has grown in terms of both its share of the total 
population of households and its share of national income. The former is 
explained in primarily by the growth of the „underclass‟, i.e. households who (to 
borrow from Wilson, 1987) are „truly disadvantaged‟: households with 
unemployed but without any working members, disadvantaged not only by their 
lack of skills but also by their lack of social capital, in a labour market in which 
connections are imperative in the face of very high unemployment (with the 
unemployment rate standing at about 35 percent, down from a peak of 40 
percent in the early 2000s) (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). The growth in the 
lower cluster of classes‟ share of national income reflects primarily the 
expansion of government social assistance programmes. 
 
Insofar as the class structure has changed, it has not resulted in any major 
diminution of interpersonal inequality. The social structure has changed, 
however, in terms of the relationship between race and class. The lower cluster 
of classes remains entirely African, but the higher cluster of classes has 
continued to diversify in racial terms. Improved educational opportunities for 
African people combined with government policies that promoted affirmative 
action (in both public and private sectors) and „black economic empowerment‟ 
(meaning primarily transfers of capital from white to black, and especially 
African, people) meant accelerated upward mobility of some African people into 
the upper classes (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). In Johannesburg, by 2001, 
„middle-class‟ was evenly divided between white people, on the one side, and 
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black (i.e. African, Indian and coloured) people on the other (Crankshaw, 2008: 
1697). Nationally and in cities such as Johannesburg, the distribution of income 
within the African population has become as unequal as for the population as a 
whole, i.e. including all racial categories (Leibbrandt et al., 2009; Seekings, 
2009). Nowhere is the deracialisation of the elite and middle class more 
apparent than in urban shopping malls (see, for example, Nkuna, 2006).  
 
 
The persistence of segregation 
 
Given that the class structure remains largely unchanged, and highly unequal, 
whilst deracialisation is limited to the upper cluster of classes, one might expect 
that racial segregation would have declined only in higher-income 
neighbourhoods. Initial studies of post-apartheid segregation found that the pace 
of desegregation was very slow indeed (Christopher, 2001, 2005): the „post-
apartheid‟ city should perhaps be viewed as a „neo-apartheid‟ city, with the 
overwhelming majority of people living in mono-racial areas.  
 
There are exceptions to this general pattern. In Johannesburg, in the early 1990s, 
the inner city was rapidly transformed as African people moved in and white 
residents moved out (Morris, 1993). In Cape Town, a handful of 
neighbourhoods were established for low-income African people in the midst of 
middle-class suburbia (notably Imizamo Yethu, Masiphumelele and Westlake 
on the Cape Peninsula, and Marconi Beam in northern Cape Town; see Saff, 
1998) – although, in general, public housing projects have been located on low-
cost land on the urban periphery. Lower-middle-class private housing 
developments provide an opportunity for racial integration (for example, 
Summer Greens in Cape Town: see Broadbridge, 2001). On occasion, the state 
has explicitly sought to create mixed neighbourhoods by allocating new houses 
to both coloured and African people (for example, in Delft; see Oldfield, 2004; 
Millstein, 2007; and Westlake, see Lemanski, 2006a). Overall, however, the 
„post‟-apartheid city remains heavily segregated.  
 
To describe the contemporary South African city as a „neo-apartheid‟ city 
reflects one of its dimensions, i.e. the persistence of segregation, but distracts 
attention from a second, i.e. that the consequence of rapid metropolitan growth 
is that a large proportion of the segregated city comprises neighbourhoods that 
did not exist when statutory residential segregation was abolished during the 
transition to democracy. Figure 3 shows the pattern of segregation in post-
apartheid Cape Town. The expansion of the city has entailed the reproduction of 
segregation in newly-developed neighbourhoods: predominantly white suburban 
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neighbourhoods, often gated and walled, on the northern and north-eastern 
periphery of the city, or down the Cape Peninsula to the south (indicated by the 
black arrows); the rapid expansion of overwhelmingly African neighbourhoods 
in an easterly direction (marked “A”), and the slower growth of coloured 
neighbourhoods in pockets around the former coloured „group areas‟ (marked 
“C”). Only in one area – Delft (marked “C/A”) – has there been significant 
racial integration of coloured and African people. 
 















Economic factors are clearly part of the explanation of segregation in new as 
well as old neighbourhoods. As Besteman (2008: ch. 2) emphasises in the case 
of Cape Town, coloured and African people face severe economic obstacles in 
moving into formerly white neighbourhoods where the prices of housing and 
land are inflated. As in the USA, access to higher-paid employment does not 
mean that the upwardly-mobile can put down deposits on property. In Cape 
Town, the gaps between each step on the housing „ladder‟ are so large, relative 
to incomes, that getting onto one step does not mean that it is easy to ascend 
further (Lemanski, 2010). Economic factors might be buttressed by racism on 
the part of richer, white South Africans. Johannesburg‟s city centre transformed 
rapidly because, when African people began to move in, white residents fled to 
the city‟s gated and walled northern suburbs. Employers followed them, and 
Johannesburg‟s northern neighbourhoods themselves were soon transformed 
into a new „edge city‟ that was largely independent of the former central city 
(Beavon, 2004; see also Saff, 1998; Lemanski, 2006b).  The continuing 
separation of rich and poor neighbourhoods reflected also the failures of public 
planning (Watson, 2002; Harrison et al., 2008). 
 
These explanations are not entirely adequate, however. For one thing, as 
Crankshaw (2008) emphasises, many early studies underestimated the extent of 
desegregation in richer neighbourhoods. In Johannesburg, he found, somewhere 
between one-quarter and one-third of the residents (excluding domestic workers) 
of Johannesburg‟s middle-class northern neighbourhoods were African, 
coloured or Indian by 2001, and the proportion was higher still in formerly white 
neighbourhoods in the south of the city. Novels provide the most vivid 
illustration of the growth of the suburban African upper classes. There are 
echoes of Pierre Bourdieu in Kopano Matlwa‟s novel Coconut. Matlwa (2007) 
describes Ofilwe (or „Fifi‟, as she prefers to be called), who lives in the Little 
Valley Country Estate with her newly-rich (African) family. Ofilwe speaks 
English (the „TV language‟) at home, and attends a formerly white school. 
Every Sunday her family goes to the Silver Spoon Coffee Shop (in the Little 
Square Shopping Centre) to eat Traditional English Breakfasts. The central 
moral issue at the heart of novels such as Coconut is the dilemma that arises 
when newly-rich African people seek to emphasis their own status, relative to 
other African people, whilst themselves encountering white racism and social 
exclusion. The fact that embourgeoisment is accompanied by such a dilemma 
does little, however, to mitigate the divides of class-segregated cities. 
 
There has been less desegregation in most cheaper areas of the post-apartheid 
city, but economic explanations do not suffice in such areas, especially in Cape 
Town where segregation persists among similarly poor African and coloured 
populations. Despite the emergence of a housing market in even low-income 
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neighbourhoods, segregation is reproduced to a far greater extent than would be 
expected given patterns of income distribution. One reason for this is that 
opportunities exist in most cities for many upwardly-mobile people to find better 
housing within the overall racial pattern of the city. In Johannesburg, a 
prosperous middle class lives in elite suburbs within Soweto, and can shop at the 
massive Maponya Mall („where South Africa‟s vibrant and trendy Sowetan 
community gather to shop, socialise, eat, and to see and be seen‟: see 
www.maponyamall.co.za). Cape Town‟s Khayelitsha is home to far fewer 
middle-class people than Soweto, but it too now contains gated communities 
built for African teachers and other relatively high-income households. 
Similarly, prosperous coloured families can extend their existing houses or build 
large new properties within the broad confines of formerly coloured 
neighbourhoods. The precise motivation for such patterns is unclear, but is 
likely to entail a mix of economic constraint and social preference. Post-
apartheid Cape Town thus increasingly comprises a patchwork of differently 
classed neighbourhoods within broadly mono-racial areas of the city. 
 
Another reason for continued segregation in the city is the mechanism by which 
plots and houses have been allocated in the massive new public housing projects 
that have contributed greatly to the expansion of every major South African city. 
Most public housing has been ear-marked for residents of specified informal 
settlements, with disregard for city-wide waiting-lists. When a number of 
informal settlements are pressing claims to public housing, complex negotiations 
are undertaken to allocate certain numbers of sites to each „community‟. 
Moreover, continued immigration into informal settlements generally means that 
the allocation of houses to the „community‟ fails to solve the „problem‟, and 
additional housing projects need to be earmarked to the (new) members of the 
existing „community‟. In a situation where, for a mix of reasons, informal 
settlements are both almost entirely African and politically militant, new 
housing projects are as mono-racial as the older parts of the city. People living 
in the backyards of formal townships or sharing overcrowded housing with older 
kin are rarely able to mobilise the collective political pressure required to ensure 
an allocation of new houses or plots. The consequence is that most new 
neighbourhoods remain unmixed by various criteria, including racially. 
 
Whatever the reasons, the persistence of racial segregation in most parts of the 
city has important social and perhaps political consequences. Many urban South 
Africans remain extraordinarily ignorant about their fellow-citizens. In Cape 
Town, for example, white and coloured people remain deeply ignorant about the 
city‟s growing African population, whilst the many unemployed people in 
African (and coloured) neighbourhoods have little contact with their richer and 
white fellow citizens (see Besteman 2008, ch.3; Bray et al., 2010). Urban 
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politics remains highly racialised, with white, coloured and Indian voters 
supporting the opposition Democratic Alliance whilst urban African voters 
supported the ANC (at least until 2009, when a section of the ANC split to form 






The post-apartheid city remains deeply divided by class and, for the most part 
and for whatever reason, race also. A series of studies suggest that these 
inequalities are linked to „neo-liberal‟ policies with regard to urban 
infrastructure, housing and services. The privatisation or commercialisation of 
municipal services, and the accompanying emphasis on cost-recovery, have 
allegedly led to the denial of basic social and economic rights to the poor. 
Whereas racial discrimination underlay the fragmented and unequal apartheid 
city, now neo-liberalism and class underlie the fragmented and unequal post- (or 
neo-) apartheid city – although these inequities have been challenged by militant 
urban social movements. In this view, the pervasive application of neoliberal 
principles has not only prevented the decommodification required to realise the 
progressive ambitions of the RDP and constitution, but has even rolled back the 
partial decommodification that preceded the transition to democracy (McDonald 
and Pape, 2002; Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002; Harrison et al., 2003; 
McDonald, 2008).  
 
This argument requires ignoring important aspects of post-apartheid policy. It 
relies overmuch on the form in which public services are provided and the 
discourse sometimes used by public officials. It pays too little attention to the 
actual distribution of public services or to the financing thereof. Whilst post-
apartheid service delivery is indeed characterised by an emphasis on „cost-
recovery‟ and „private-public partnerships‟, these are underpinned by highly 
redistributive financing, such that rich taxpayers (and ratepayers at the 
municipal level) finance heavily public schooling, health care and municipal 
services for the poor. High-income neighbourhoods typically receive better-
quality services than low-income ones, but they pay a disproportionate share of 
the cost of services city-wide. In other words, there has been a widespread and 
rising decommodification of service provision for poor people in many parts of 
South Africa‟s major cities.  
 
Access by the poor to these public services has improved since the end of 
apartheid.  In Cape Town, for example, only 33 percent of African households 
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lived in formal housing in 1996; by 2003, 55 percent did so. In 1996, about two-
thirds of African households had their refuse removed by the council at least one 
per week; by 2003 this proportion had risen to 87 percent. The improvement of 
service delivery is even more striking when it is presented not in terms of 
percentages of the relevant population, but in absolute numbers, because in-
migration from rural areas accelerated population growth. Between 1996 and 
2001, for example, the absolute number of African households in Cape Town 
rose by 50 percent. Over this period the actual number of African households 
with weekly refuse removal doubled, even though the proportion only rose by 
about 20 percentage points. Since the transition to democracy there has been a 
massive improvement in services in poorer parts of the city, and this has not 
been funded along market principles.   
 
The most important element of decommodification in South Africa is the 
government‟s set of social assistance programmes. The ANC inherited a system 
of unusually generous, non-contributory pensions and grants payable to 
categories of deserving poor: the elderly, disabled, and single mothers. After 
1994 the ANC government expanded this system, such that it entailed the 
redistribution of approximately 3.5 percent of national income by the late 2000s. 
In the six major metropolitan areas, approximately one half of all households 
receive one or more government grants. Among the lower cluster of classes, the 
proportion is close to two-thirds.  
 
Post-apartheid South African cities are certainly characterised by deep economic 
and social inequalities as well as spatial fragmentation. But they are also cities 
undergoing important processes of partial transformation. Most importantly, 
African people may have been the victims of apartheid, but they are now active 
agents in the remaking of the city, playing major roles in both the desegregation 
of higher-income neighbourhoods and the reproduction of segregation in lower-
income areas, as well as – through the mechanisms of representative democracy 
as well as direct action – in the continued uneven decommodification of 






Guide to Further Reading 
 
The classic studies of South African cities were prompted by the imposition of 
the Group Areas Act: Kuper et al. (1958) and Western (1981). On migrant 
labour in towns, see for example Ramphele (1993). Lemon (ed., 1991) includes 
chapters on all of the major cities. Robinson (1996) focuses on urban 
governance. Bickford-Smith, van Heyningen and Worden (1999) is an 
outstanding illustrated history of Cape Town. The massive literature on urban 
history is ably reviewed in Maylam (1995), Freund (2005) and Bickford-Smith 
(2008).  On the changing political economy nationally, see especially Seekings 
and Nattrass (2005). 
 
Notable recent book-length studies of South African cities in the 1990s and 
2000s include: Saff (1998), Watson (2006), Bahre (2008), Jensen (2008), 
McDonald (2008), and Besteman (2008) on Cape Town; Morris (1999), Beall, 
Crankshaw and Parnell (2002), Tomlinson et al. (eds, 2003), Beavon (2004), 
and Murray (2008) on Johannesburg; and Freund and Padayachee (eds, 2002) on 
Durban. 
 
Post-apartheid urban policy is analysed critically in many writings, including 
especially McDonald and Pape (2002), Watson (2002), Pillay et al. (2006), 
McDonald (2008), Harrison et al. (2008), and in numerous journal articles 
(especially in the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Urban 
Studies, and the South African-based Urban Forum). Urban ethnography is 
weak in contemporary South Africa; for exceptions, see Ross (1995), Ramphele 
(2002), and Bray et al. (2010), on Cape Town, and especially the exceptional 
study of witchcraft in Soweto by Ashforth (2005). Urban politics is another 
neglected area, but on social movements see Ballard et al. (2006). 
 
South Africa is unusual in that many (although not all) survey datasets are 
readily available online. Surveys from the parastatal Statistics South Africa 
cover, inter alia, the labour force and household well-being (see 
www.statsSA.gov.za). Readily available datasets from universities include the 
Cape Area Panel Study (of adolescents in Cape Town, from 2002; see 
www.caps.uct.ac.za) and the National Income Dynamics Study (from 2008; see 
www.nids.uct.ac.za).  New research is often available online through working 
paper series (see e.g. www.cssr.uct.ac.za, www.saldru.uct.ac.za, 
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